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The Effect of Improper Venue Upon
Jurisdiction of the Person and Jurisdiction
of the Subject Matter
ROBERT L. W.Ls*
There is much apparent confusion between the conceptions of
jurisdiction and venue. This confusion is unnecessary and could be
avoided by careful analysis.
So far as definitions of the two terms are concerned, there is no
difficulty. For our purpose, jurisdiction may be defined as the power
to hear and determine. Venue, on the other hand, may be defined as
the "locality of a law suit-the place where judicial authority may
be exercised."' The distinction between jurisdiction and venue has
been stated clearly by the Ohio Supreme Court:
Jurisdiction must not be confounded with venue.
Jurisdiction is the right to hear and determine a cause, but
the term is used in the sense of power rather than in the
sense of selection. There is no doubt that courts of common
pleas in Ohio have the right to hear cases of injuries to per-
son and property and of wrongful death by railroad com-
panies, but it does not follow that Ohio courts must, and at
all events, hear all cases which may be tendered. In some
of the former decisions of this court the language concern-
ing the word 'jurisdiction' has not been carefully selected,
thereby leading to some misapprehension. Jurisdiction may
exist to hear and determine causes of a certain class, and
yet that jurisdiction may not be permitted to attach to
certain cases by reasons of limitations of venue. Venue
signifies the geographic division where a cause shall be
tried. Both jurisdiction and venue depend upon constitu-
tional and statutory provisions. While certain provisions
may give the courts power to hear certain causes, other
provisions may limit the rights of certain parties to avail
themselves of that jurisdiction.2
So far there seems to be no difficulty, and no reason why there
should be any confusion between these two conceptions.
At this point, it should be noted that there are two kinds of.
jurisdiction.
Associate Professor of Law, College of Law, The Ohio State University.
1 Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Consolidated Stone Co., 278 U. S. 177,
179, (1928).
2 Loftus v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co., 107 Ohio St. 352, 356, 140 N.E. 94, pe-
tition for writ of error dismissed, 266 U. S. 639 (1924). Other definitions may
be found in Foster, Place of Trial in Civil Actions, 43 HARv. L. REV. 1217 (1930),
and Note, The Venue of Actions as Affecting the Jurisdiction of Courts, 11
1nm. L. REv. 260 (1927).
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JURISDICTION OF THE SUBJECT MATTER AND
JURISDICTION OF THE PERSON
The first is jurisdiction of the subject matter. Perhaps the mean-
ing of this phrase may be best approached from a negative view-
point. If a court does not have jurisdiction of the subject matter, it
cannot render a valid judgment. For example, in most actions, the
minimum pecuniary jurisdictional limitation of the common pleas
courts in Ohio is $100.01. Therefore, if a suit for $100.00 is filed in a
common pleas court, it would be correct to say that the court does
not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of that particular action.
Likewise, if a patent infringement suit were filed in common pleas
court, it would be correct to say that the court does not have juris-
diction of the subject matter of that particular action. Subject to
qualifications not here material, the parties can not waive the objec-
tion of lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter. As it is often put,
"the parties cannot confer jurisdiction of the subject matter."
Now as to the second kind of jurisdiction-jurisdiction
of the person. If a court does not have jurisdiction of the person of
the defendant, it cannot render a valid in personam judgment against
the defendant, even though it has jurisdiction of the subject matter
of the particular action. But, unlike jurisdiction of the subject
matter, a party may waive the objection of lack of jurisdiction of his
person. Thus, even if a court at first lacks jurisdiction of the person
of the defendant, the defendant may enter a general appearance and
thereby confer upon the court jurisdiction of his person. With these
elementary but fundamental 3 principles in mind, let us consider the
judicial reaction to venue problems.
There is no difficulty if venue is proper. That is, if a statute re-
quires that an action be brought in the county where the defendant
may be served, and if the action is brought in A County, and sum-
mons is served on the defendant in A County, there is no problem.
The court has jurisdiction, and venue is proper. However, if the ac-
tion is brought in A County, summons is issued to the sheriff of B
County and he serves the defendant in B County, it is clear that the
place or venue of the action does not comply with the statute. In
other words, the venue is improper. However, this statement, of
itself, does not solve practical problems.
THE Two PROBLEMS
The most frequent of these problems may be stated as follows:
PROBLEM A.
Plaintiff sues defendant in the wrong county or dis-
trict. Defendant does not appear, and the court renders a
default judgment against him. Is the judgment valid?
3 Frequently courts refer to a statute providing for place of trial as be-
ing a "jurisdictional statute." Such a term is patently ambiguous. Either
jurisdiction of the person or jurisdiction of the subject matter may be meant.
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PROBLEM B.
Plaintiff sues defendant in the wrong county or district.
Defendant appears generally, without raising the objection
that the action was brought in the wrong county or district.
May defendant thereafter, in the trial court, or in an appel-
late court, successfully contend that the court has no juris-
diction?4
These are problems which are frequently faced by the courts,
and in dealing with them the courts have talked in confusing fashion
about jurisdiction and venue. Why should this be, in view of the
ease with which we may distinguish the two concepts, on the defi-
nition level? Why should this be, when there seems to be no con-
nection between the two concepts, considered abstractly? Why
should lawyers be unable to predict successfully the outcome of
venue issues on the basis of apparently definite previous decisions?
THREE JuDicIAL PosITIoNs WiTH RESPECT To VENuE STATUTES
In construing a "venue" statute, a court may take one of at least
three possible positions:
Position 1. The statute relates solely to venue, and has no juris-
dictional significance whatever. That is, even though the action is
brought in the wrong county or district, this fact does not impair the
jurisdiction of the court to any extent whatever.
Position 2. If the action is brought in the wrong county or dis-
trict, the court does not acquire jurisdiction of the person of the de-
fendant by the service of summons.
Position 3. If the action is brought in the wrong county or dis-
trict, the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action.
Let us now consider some illustrative cases. 5
In Commercial Casualty Insurance Company v. The Consolidat-
ed Stone Company,6 plaintiff, an Indiana corporation, brought a
transitory action against defendant, a New Jersey corporation,
in the District Court of the United States for the Northern Dis-
trict of Ohio. The defendant was doing business in Ohio, and
summons was served within the district upon defendant's statutory
agent. Defendant neither appeared nor answered within the
required time, and default judgment was entered in favor of
4 If the defendant makes a timely special appearance and properly raises
the venue objection, it will be sustained, whether the court regards the
question as "jurisdictional" or not. Therefore, opinions dealing with this
third problem will not be discussed, although the language of such opinions
may exhibit the same contrariety of approach as those dealing with the first
two problems.
5 Only a few selected United States Supreme Court and Ohio cases are
referred to in this paper. No attempt has been made to examine cases from
other jurisdictions, or even to examine all the United States Supreme Court
and Ohio venue cases. It is quite possible that judicial opinions may be found
which analyze the present problems satisfactorily.
6 278 U.S. 177 (1928), supra note 1.
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plaintiff. Later in the same term defendant moved that the judg-
ment be vacated and the action dismissed because the action was
brought in a district in which neither party resided. The motion was
denied and defendant sued out a writ of error from the circuit court
of appeals. That court certified to the supreme court the question
as to whether it was open to the defendant, after permitting the case
to proceed to judgment by default, to object that the action was
not brought in the district of the residence of either party. The
supreme court answered the question in the negative. Although
the venue was unquestionably improper, as the jurisdiction of the
court was founded solely on diversity, and the Northern District
of Ohio was not the residence of either the plaintiff or the defend-
ant,7 the court held that the objection was "a waivable matter
of venue only," that the defendant waived the objection by not
asserting it "seasonably," and therefore (necessarily) that the
motion to vacate was properly denied. The court contrasted the
jurisdiction8 and venue9 statutes:
These provisions often have been examined and con-
strued by this Court. Summarized, the decisions are direct-
ly to the effect that the first provision invests each of the
district courts with general jurisdiction of all civil suits
between citizens of different States, where the matter in
controversy is of the requisite pecuniary value; and that the
other provision does not detract from that general jurisdic-
tion, but merely accords to the defendant a personal privi-
lege respecting the venue, or place of suit, which he may as-
sert, or may waive, at his election.
The court thus attributed no jurisdictional significance whatever to
improper venue. In terms of our formulation, the court took Posi-
tion 1. If it had held that by reason of improper venue the District
Court did not acquire jurisdiction of the person of the defendant by
the service of summons (Position 2), it would have held, necessar-
ily, that the judgment was void and should be vacated, as there had
been no appearance whatever by the defendant. If the court had held
that by reason of improper venue the District Court lacked jurisdic-
tion of the subject matter (Position 3), it would have held, necessar-
7 In this situation, venue would now be proper, under 28 U. S. C., Sec. 1391
(c), as defendant was a corporation.
8 Former U. S. C. Sec. 41, providing that district courts shall have "original
jurisdiction" of certain classes of civil suits, including suits between citizens
of different states. Where the value of the matter is controversy, exclusive
of interest and costs, exceeds $3,000. The corresponding provision of the
Judicial Code of 1948 is 28 U. S. C. Sec. 1332.
9 Former U. S. C. Sec. 112, providing that"... where the jurisdiction is
founded only on the fact that the action is between citizens of different States,
suit shall be brought only in the district of the residence of either the plain-
tiff or the defendant." The corresponding provision of the Judicial Code of
1948 is 28 U. S. C. Sec. 1391 (a).
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ily, that the default judgment was void and should be vacated. The
Boston Consolidated Mining Co., 10 another diversity case in which
court did not mention Western Loan and Savings Co. v. Butte and
venue was improper. " In the Western Loan case the defendant had
entered a general appearance, and the supreme court held that:
The defendant had waived objection to jurisdiction
over its person, and, by filing the demurrer on the ground
stated, submitted to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court.
The court's position in the Western Loan case is basically different
from its position in the Commercial Casualty case. The language
of the Western Loan opinion would seem to indicate that the court,
in construing the diversity venue statute, was taking Position 2.
Before the Commercial Casualty case was decided, a defendant
sued in the wrong district might well have assumed that under
the Western Loan decision, he would be safe in not appearing. If
the court in the Commercial Casualty case had applied, literally,
its opinion in the Western Loan case, it would have held the other
way, and its opinion presumably would have said in substance:
As the defendant made no appearance, it did not waive
the objection of lack of jurisdiction of its person, and did
not submit to the jurisdiction of the District Court. There-
fore, the judgment was void, and should have been vacated.
As the facts were different in the two cases, the supreme court did
not necessarily violate the principle of stare decisis in the Commer-
cial Casualty case by holding as it did. However, it might have
have clarified the law by referring to the Western Loan case, point-
ing out that the language of that opinion was too broad, and that the
problem presented by the fact situation in the Commerical Casualty
case required that the applicable principles be restated. In terms of
our formulation, the facts in the Western Loan case presented
Problem B, whereas the facts in the Commercial Casualty case pre-
sented Problem A. A court faced with Problem B (as in the Western
Loan case) is not forced to choose between Position 1 and Position 2,
as the same result will be reached if either of the first two positions
is taken. However, a court faced with Problem A (as in the Com-
mercial Casualty case), is forced to choose between Position 1, and
Position 2, as the two positions give different solutions to Problem
A.' The language which had been used in the Western Loan case
W0 210 U. S. 368 (1908).
1 Venue was improper for the same reason as in the Commercial Cas-
ualty case. Plaintiff was a citizen of Utah; defendant was a citizen of New
York; the action was brought in the Circuit Court for the District of Mon-
tana. Jurisdiction was based solely on diversity of citizenship.
1.2 1n Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., Ltd., 308 U. S. 165, 168
(1939), the court, in discussing waiver of the objection to improper venue,
said: "Whether such surrender of a personal immunity be conceived neg-
atively as a waiver or positively as a consent to be sued, is merely an ex-
1950]
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to solve Problem B would have given the "wrong" answer to Pro-
blem A in the Commercial Casualty case.
In Ohio, the general venue statute, Ohio General Code Section
11277, provides:
General rule as to other actions. Every other action
must be brought in the county in which a defendant resides
or may be summoned....
Ohio General Code Section 11282 provides:
When summons may issue to another county. When the
action is rightly brought in any county, according to the
provisions of the next preceding chapter, a summons may
be issued to any other county, against one or more of the
defendants, at the plaintiff's request....
In Snyder v. Clough,13 plaintiff commenced an action in the
Common Pleas Court of Stark County against four defendants, all
of whom resided in Ohio counties other than Stark. The prayer of
the petition was for damages for pollution of a stream, and for an in-
junction against further pollution. Summonses were issued to the re-
spective counties where defendants resided, and served uponthemin
those counties. None of the defendants appeared, and a default judg-
ment was entered against themfor money damages, and they were en-
joined from further polluting the stream. Twenty-seven months
after the entry of judgment, defendant Clough filed a motion to
quash the service of summons and to vacate the judgment. This pre-
sented to the trial court the same problem that was presented to the
United States Supreme Court in the Commercial Casualty case. In
terms of our formulation, the trial court was presented withProblem
A. The court overruled the motion, and Clough appealed to the court
of appeals. That court stated the principal question as follows:
pression of literary preference." The statement is true in context. However,
it will be seen that when a court is faced with what we have called Problem
A, it is not merely a matter of literary preference whether the court thinks
that a defendant waives the objection by failure to raise it (Position 1), or
whether it thinks that the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant unless and until the defendant positively consents to be sued by
entering a general appearance (Position 2). The distinction between the
two conceptions is blurred in General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore & Mich-
igan Southern Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 261, 273 (1922), wherein the court, in dis-
cussing the objection of improper venue, said, "And the inability of the court
to proceed with the cause in the presence of such an objection would not have
resulted from any want of power to entertain and determine such a suit be-
tween such parties, if they were before it, but only because the company de-
clined to yield the necessary jurisdiction of its person." Although the quo-
tation refers explicitly to jurisdiction of the person, the use of the phrase "de-
clined to yield" leaves open the question of the effect of a "failure to decline
to yield" (Problem A). That question is answered six years later in the
Commercial Casualty decision.
13 71 Ohio App. 440, 50 N. E. 2d 384 (1942).
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Did the trial court erroneously exercise jurisdiction over
the person of the defendants? In other words, was the ac-
tion properly commenced in Stark County, and service of
summons rightly made?
It held that the action was not properly brought in Stark
County, as the defendants could only be sued and the action proper-
ly commenced in a county in which one of the defendants resided
or service could be made on him. It therefore reversed the order
of the trial court, and ordered the default judgment vacated.
As we have said, the Ohio Court of Appeals was faced with the
same problem which faced the United States Supreme Court in the
Commercial Casualty case. In this situation, the United States
Supreme Court took Position 1, while the Ohio Court of Appeals
took Position 2. It ignored the possibility of Position 1, just as com-
pletely as the United States Supreme Court ignored the possibility
of Position 2. The court's opinion in Snyder v. Clough gives no in-
dication that it is aware that it is attributing jurisdictional signi-
ficance to venue, i.e., that it is holding a "venue" statute to be "juris-
dictional." It is this lack of awareness which leads to lack of explicit-
ness in venue opinions, and results in bewildering law students and
misleading lawyers.
This is not by any means to say that the Stark County Court of
Appeals was wrong in the result reached, or even that it was wrong
in taking Position 2. It was entirely correct, and in accord with pre-
vious Ohio decisions. Many Ohio decisions, in interpreting various
Ohio venue statutes, have talked in terms of Position 2, i.e., that if
an action is not brought in the proper county, the court therefore
does not, by the service of summons, acquire jurisdiction of the per-
son of the defendant. Thus, in Southern Ohio Rd. Co. v. Morey,14
the court stated:
Section 5027 provides that: 'An action against ...... a rail-
road company, may be brought in any county through or in-
to which such road .... passes.' This section, like the other
sections of chapter five of the code of civil procedure, that
merely prescribe the county in which a defendant may be
sued, relate only to the jurisdiction over the person.
Neither a railroad company nor other corporation, nor even
a natural person, is bound to appear in an action in obedi-
ence to a summons served out of the prescribed county. It
is a privilege, however, that is personal, and may be waiv-
ed; and this court has uniformly held, that a defendant by
appearing in court, and, without objecting to its jurisdiction
over his person, invoking any action in the cause, waives
this privilege, and submits his person to the jurisdiction of
the court. Harrington v. Heath, 15 Ohio 483, 487-8; Gilliland
v. Sellers, 2 Ohio St. 223; Wood v. O'Ferrall, 19 Ohio St.
427; Thomas v. Penrich, 28 Ohio St. 55; Fitzgerald v. Cross,
14 47 Ohio St. 207, 24 N.E. 269 (1890).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
30 Ohio St. 450; O'Neal v. Blessing, 34 Ohio St. 33; Handy
v. Insurance Co., 37 Ohio St. 366; Elliott v. Lawhead, 43
Ohio St. 171. The plaintiff in error not only appeared with-
out objecting to the jurisdiction of the court of common
pleas over its person, but moved to strike from the petition
certain averments ........ It thus, in the most ample man-
ner, submitted its person to the jurisdiction of the court.
(Italics added).
Language of similar import may be found in other Ohio cases.15
And one writer, discussing the Ohio venue statutes and decisions,
states:
The (Ohio) General Code makes specific provision for the
place of trial of certain classes of action, both in rem and in
personam. As in Nebraska, this is a jurisdictional' 6 require-
ment, and is not simply a provision for venue or place of
trial of these actions. The general provision for actions in
personam is... (Quoting Ohio General Code Section 11277,
supra text preceding note 13). The word 'must' as used in
the statute, is again interpreted as limiting the jurisdiction
of the court even in purely personal actions between resi-
dents of the state. The common pleas court of Ohio is there-
fore not a court of statewide jurisdiction in actions in rem,
in personal actions in which the place of trial is specifically
designated, or in transitory actions generally.17
However, in Industrial Commission v. Murphy, Is the court con-
strued Ohio General Code Section 1465-90, which provided for the
filing of an appeal from an award of the Industrial Commission "in
the common pleas court of the county wherein the injury was inflict-
ed." The court of appeals stated:
This court is of the view that the phrase in question pre-
scribes the venue of the case, and not the jurisdiction of
the court. All courts of common pleas have jurisdiction to
review on appeal the awards of the Industrial Commission.
The venue of a particular appeal is the county in which
the injury occurred, if it occurred in Ohio at all. The dis-
'5 E.g., Long v. Newhouse, 57 Ohio St. 348, 49 N.E. 79 (1897), City of
Fostoria v. Fox, 60 Ohio St. 340, 54 N. E. 370 (1899), Gorey v. Black, 100 Ohio
St. 73, 125 N. E. 126 (1919), Bucurenciu v. Ramba, 117 Ohio St. 546, 159 N. E.
565 (1927). It may be that the phraseology of Omo Gmr. CODE § 11282, supra
text preceding note 13, has been a factor in the frequent adoption of Position
2 by the Ohio courts. That section provides that when the action is "rightly
brought" in one county, summons may be issued to other counties. If the
action is not "rightly brought" in the county, it is understandable that the
courts would assume that if summons is nevertheless issued to other counties,
such summons is unauthorized by the statute and absolutely void, and that
service of such summons gives the court no jurisdiction of the person of the
defendant.
16 As to the ambiguity of the term "jurisdictional" in this connection, see
note 3, supra.
17 Coffman, Jurisdiction or Venue? 20 Mm. L. Rxv. 617, 622 (1936).
18 41 Ohio App. 206, 180 N.E. 731 (1931), motion to certify record over-
ruled, Jan. 20, 1932.
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tinction between jurisdiction and venue is pointed out in
Loftus v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co., 107 Ohio St. 352, 140 N. E.
94. The venue of an action can be waived. 27 Ruling Case
Law, 783; Southern Ohio Rd. Co. v. Morey, 47 Ohio St. 207,
24 N. E. 269; Klein v. Lust, 110 Ohio St. 197, 143 N. E. 527.
The Industrial Commission made no bimely objection to the
trial of the case in the County of Athens, rather than in
Hocking County, and, by pleading to the merits of the case,
waived its right to subsequently raise that question.
This language is much closer to the analysis of the United States
Supreme Court in the Commercial Casualty case than to that of
the Ohio Supreme Court in Southern Ohio Rd. Co. v. Morey.19
In terms of our formulation, the court of appeals is apparently tak-
ing Position 1 rather than Position 2. The court takes no notice
whatever of the inconsistency of its opinion with previous Ohio
opinions. 20 However, the difference in approach makes no difference
in the result of the Industrial Commission case, because in that
case the problem presented is Problem B, and, as we have seen,
either Position 1 or Position 2 gives the same answer to Problem
B 21
In B. & 0. Rd. Co. v. Hollenberger,22 plaintiff sued the defend-
ant in the Common Pleas Court of Seneca County, Ohio to recover
a penalty for an overcharge under the provisions of Sections 3374
and 3376 of the Revised Statutes. The overcharge complained of
did not take place in Seneca County, and therefore venue was im-
proper, under Section 5022, Revised Statutes. 23 There was no de-
murrer attacking the jurisdiction of the court, nor was the want of
jurisdiction set up in defendant's answer. The question of jurisdic-
tion was first raised on defendant's petition in error in the circuit
court, one assignment of error apparently being that the common
pleas court had no jurisdiction of the subject of the action. Upon
affirmance by the circuit court, the defendant filed a petition in
error in the Supreme Court of Ohio. The supreme court held that
19 Supra note 14.
20 E.g., Southern Ohio Rd. Co. v. Morey, supra note 14, and cases cited
supra note 15.21 Likewise, in Loftus v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co., supra note 2, the language
of the opinion points toward Position 1. However, in the Loftus case, the
defendant raised the venue question seasonably, by a motion to quash. Thus
the case had not gone far enough to present even Problem A. In this situa-
tion, if venue is improper, all three positions give the same result: the motion
must be sustained. See note 4, supra. Thus it was unnecessary for the court
to make a choice between positions.
22 76 Ohio St. 177, 81 N.E. 184 (1907).
23 NOW Omo GEN. CODE § 11271, which provides in part as follows: "Ac-
tions for the following causes must be brought in the county where the cause
of action or part thereof arose:
1. For the recovery of a fine, forfeiture, or penalty imposed by a
statute..."
1950]
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the Common Pleas Court of Seneca County lacked jurisdiction of
the subject matter of the action, stating:
it has nevertheless long been a universal rule that an objec-
tion to the jurisdiction of the 'subject-matter' can not be
waived; because, while parties may voluntarily submit their
person to the jurisdiction of a court which has jurisdiction
over the cause, they cannot confer power on the court as to
the subject-matter, for the reason that the court can derive
its general jurisdiction only from the power which created
it, the sovereignty.
The opinion concluded:
The defendant in error (plaintiff below) rests his case on
the theory that the plaintiff in error (defendant below)
has waived the objection to the jurisdiction. For the rea-
sons stated we are of the opinion that the objection to the
jurisdiction was such that the defendant below could not
and therefore did not, waive it. 'Where the court has no
authority to take cognizance of the subject-matter of the
suit, the proceedings may be dismissed at any stage of the
case, when that fact is made to appear.' Thompson v. Steam-
boat, 2 Ohio St., 28; Steamboat v. Long, 18 Ohio St., 521,
526, 533; Hamilton v. Merrill, 37 Ohio St. 682, 684, 685. The
judgments of the circuit court and the court of common
pleas are reversed, and the original petition is dismissed.
The supreme court was faced with Problem B. It ignored complete-
ly previous decisions 24 taking Position 2, and most emphatically
took Position 3. As Problem B was presented, either Position 1 or
Position 2 would have led to an opposite result.
THE SouRcE OF THE CONFUSION
We now have before us a sufficient number of venue decisions
to attempt an analysis of the cause of such apparently erratic and
unpredictable decisions. The difficulty is not one of "distinguishing
between jurisdiction and venue." The courts do not often "confuse
jurisdiction and venue." The statements of the distinction which
have been referred to previously 25 are crystal clear. It is not that
the courts fail to follow these or similar definitions; actually they
apply them with logic which is usually entirely satisfactory.
It is submitted that much of the confusion results from the fact
that when a court is faced with what we have called Problem A or
Problem B, it usually fails to perceive that two separate and dis-
tinct questions of law are presented.
The first question is solely one of statutory interpretation; it is
whether the legislature intended to attribute any jurisdictional
significance at all to the venue statute, and if so, whether juris-
diction of the person or jurisdiction of the subject matter is intend-
24 E.g., Southern Ohio Rd. Co. v. Morey, supra note 14, Long v. New-
house, supra note 15, and City of Fostoria v. Fox, supra note 15.
2s Supra notes 1 and 2 and accompanying text.
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ed. In terms of our formulation, the question is whether the court
should, with respect to the venue statute, take the first, second, or
third position. To repeat, this is simply a matter of statutory inter-
pretation. The arrangement and phraseology of venue statutes vary
considerably, and it is therefore to be expected that some venue
statutes will be interpreted by the courts as requiring Position 1,
while others will be interpreted as requiring Position 2 or Position 3.
There is nothing inherently "right" or "wrong" about any one of the
three positions. Unfortunately the language of the statutes is usually
not sufficiently clear to indicate unmistakably the intent of the leg-
islature. Therefore, the task of the courts is not easy.2 6 However,
that is all the more reason for facing squarely the problem of statu-
tory interpretation. Ib does not help at all to ignore it.
Once a court has determined (or simply assumed) the answer
to the first question of law, by taking Position 1, 2, or 3, the second
question of law is usually easy. The second question is simply this:
"Assuming Position 1 (or 2 or 3), what are the practical consequ-
ences in this particular fact situation?" For example, in the Com-
mercial Casualty case, once the United States Supreme Court as-
sumed that the problem of statutory interpretation should be an-
swered by taking Position 1, it followed inevitably that the default
judgment was valid. And when, in Snyder v. Clough, supra, in a
similar fact situation the Court of Appeals for Stark County, Ohio,
assumed that the problem of statutory interpretation should be an-
swered by taking Position 2, it followed inevitably that the default
judgment was invalid. Nevertheless, it is this relatively simple sec-
ond question of law which occupies the attention of most courts al-
most to the exclusion of the first question, although the second ques-
iton is dependent upon the answer to the first. A court usually as-
sumes that one of the three positions is correct, and then devotes its
opinion to a discussion of why a certain result must logically follow.
Once the court assumes one of the three positions, it is a case of
"downhill the rest of the way". As a result of this unintentional
avoidance of what is the only question of any real difficulty, an opin-
ion in a venue case usually has little value to the bench and bar
2OUsually the clues to legislative intent are faint. It may be significant
that the statute uses the word "jurisdiction" rather than "venue" or "place
of trial", or that it says the action "may" instead of "must" be brought in a
certain county, or that the action "must be brought only" in a certain
county. The arrangement of the statutes may be relevent: if the
venue and jurisdiction statutes are segregated, this may evince a legislative
intent that no jurisdictional significance should be attributed to improper
venue, but if the venue and jurisdictional provisions are intermingled, it is
more likely that the legislature intended that improper venue should deprive
the court of jurisdiction of the person of the defendant or jurisdiction of
the subject matter.
19501
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except when the identical fact pattern recurs. In future cases in-
volving different fact patterns, the opinion may well prove to be a
snare and a delusion, as the court will probably in a later case again
ignore the first step of the analysis and may make a different as-
sumption as to the proper position to be taken.
Thus, in Western Loan and Savings Co. v. Butte and Consolidat-
ed Mining Co.,2 the United States Supreme Court devotes almost
no discussion to the first step of the analysis, (i.e., the question of
statutory interpretation), stating simply:
The circuit court for the district of Montana was with-
out jurisdiction of the action, because neither of the par-
ties to it was a resident of that district. . . But. . .the
objection that there is not jurisdiction in a particular dis-
trict may be waived by appearing and pleading to the
merits .... We are of opinion that the defendant had waived
objection to jurisdiction over its person....
Thus the court assumed without discussion that Congress intended
that if neither party is a resident of the district of suit, the trial court
necessarily does not have jurisdiction of the person of the defendant
merely by service of summons. It thus attributed a particular kind of
jurisdictional significance to improper venue (i.e., it took Position
2), without evincing any awareness of the fact that it might have
taken either of two other alternatives: it might have held that
Congress did not intend to attribute any jurisdictional significance
at all to improper venue (i.e., it might have taken Position 1), or
it might have held that Congress intended that if neither party is
a resident of the district of suit, the trial court would therefore
lack jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action (ie., it might
have taken Position 3).
When the United States Supreme Court was faced with Prob-
lem A in the Commercial Casualty case, it did recognize that the
first question for it to decide was whether the venue statute detracts
from the "general jurisdiction" of the district court, or whether, on
the other hand, it merely "accords to the defendant a personal
privilege respecting the venue, or place of suit, which he may
assert, or may waive, at his election." Thus the court did not skip
the first question entirely, as is so often done. However, its treat-
ment of the first question is not satisfactory, as it reaches its con-
clusion by merely summarizing the previous decisions. By thus
contenting itself with a mere summarization, the court failed to
explain the inconsistency between its opinion and such previous
opinions as the Western Loan opinion.28 The Court of Appeals for
27 S upra note 10.
2 8 In Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., Ltd., supra note 12,
the United States Supreme Court, in discussing the distinction between juris-
diction and venue, refers to "a period of confusing deviation," during which
the distinction was not observed. No cases are cited.
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Stark County, Ohio, in Snyder v. Clough, supra, showed even less
concern with the first question. Without so much as purporting
to "summarize" previous decisions, it assumed without any discus-
sion whatever that if venue was improper, the court necessarily
lacked jurisdiction of the person of the defendant.29 As previous-
ly indicated, the court of appeals would have been able to justify
its position on the basis of previous opinions of the Ohio Supreme
Court, but again it is regrettable that it did not explicitly recog-
nize in its opinion that it was making a choice between two pos-
sible alternatives. But probably the most striking Ohio case is
B. & 0. Rd. Co. v. Hollenberger, supra. In spite of the fact that
many previous Ohio cases had assumed that wrong venue merely
deprived the court of jurisdiction of the person of the defendant
(Position 2), the court assumed, without any discussion and with-
out any reference to the previous venue cases, that improper venue
deprived the court of jurisdiction of the subject matter of the
action (Position 3). Thus the supreme court has construed one
venue statute (now Ohio General Code Section 11271) one way,
and another venue statute (now Ohio General Code Section 11277)
another way, without the slightest explanation for its inconsist-
ency. No Ohio case has been found which discusses or even men-
tions the inconsistency between B. & 0. Rd. Co. v. Hollenberger
and the other Ohio venue decisions. The failure to recognize the
existence of the two distinct questions of law is to blame for this
situation.
SUMMARY
Although it is frequently said that jurisdiction and venue are
confused by courts and lawyers, it is submitted that the two concepts
are so far apart that it is almost impossible to confuse them. The con-
fusion, which certainly exists, results from a failure to recognize
that every venue statute presents a problem of statutory inter-
pretation, in that a court may be called upon to determine whether
a statute providing for the place of trial (1) relates solely to
venue, and has no effect on the jurisdiction of the court, or (2)
deprives the court of jurisdiction of the person of the defendant,
if venue is improper, or (3) deprives the court of jurisdiction of
the subject matter of the action, if venue is improper. However,
this problem of statutory interpretation is seldom recognized, or
at least is seldom discussed. Instead, the answer to the problem
of statutory interpretation is assumed, and the opinions are devot-
ed to a discussion of (1) the effect of improper venue, when juris-
diction is unimpaired, or (2) the effect of lack of jurisdiction
of the person, or (3) the effect of lack of jurisdiction of the
subject matter. This failure to focus attention and discussion on
29 See the quoted language in the text, supra following note 13.
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the real problem - the problem of statutory interpretation -re-
sults in inconsistent opinions by the same court. The statutes are
often not clear, but if the opinions of the courts called attention
to the ambiguities in the statutes, it is not unreasonable to expect
that the legislatures would attempt to clarify the statutes. While
the law remains in its present state of confusion, lawyers should
not rely on venue decisions unless they are on "all fours."
